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ARGUMENT
I.

MS. WHITE HAS MARSHALED THE EVIDENCE WHEN NECESSARY
IN HER APPEAL.
Without citing one example in support of its argument, Mule-Hide argues that Ms.

White failed to marshal the evidence in her brief. Mule-Hide has not attempted to apply
the basic statement of law to the facts of the case nor does it attempt to specify any
particular fact that Ms. White failed to marshal. Contrary to Mule-Hide's argument, Ms.
White marshaled the evidence, as necessary for its factual challenge, beginning on page
31 of her brief.
Mule-Hide's argument that Ms. White failed to marshal the evidence lacks
substance, specificity, and merit. Therefore, is should be disregarded by the Court.

II.

POINT TWO OF THE APPELLEE'S BRIEF FAILS TO APPLY ANY
LEGAL THEORY AND MISSTATES THE FINDINGS OF THE TRIAL
COURT.
In "Point Two," Mule-Hide argues that the evidence supports the Trial Court's

findings. Mule-Hide, however, fails to cite any evidence. Rather, Mule-Hide simply
cites (with some modification) the Trial Court's findings. Without any citation to the
evidence, Ms. White and this Court are unable to evaluate Mule-Hide's argument. Thus,
since Mule-Hide has failed to detail any evidence in support of the findings, this
argument should be ignored.

1

More importantly, Mule-Hide misstates the Trial Court's findings. Mule-Hide
states that the Trial Court found: "Ron Case Supply Co. took over ABC Supply and any
inventory it had. (T. 177). However, Mule-Hide was not notified. (T. 175-176.)"
Contrary to Mule-Hide's second statement, the Trial Court found only that Ms. White
had not sent the revocation letter under the guarantee and that Mule-Hide had not
received the February 13th letter sent to suppliers. (Trial Tr. 693 at 175-76.) The Court
never made any finding that Mule-Hide did not have any notice of the ABC Supply's
demise or the fact that Ron Case Supply was purchasing or taking over the assets.
Moreover, as discussed in Appellant's initial brief and in the remainder of this brief, the
evidence of Mule-Hide's knowledge through its representative is overwhelming.
Mule-Hide then states: "The product ordered was shipped and used by Ron Case
Supply Co. without notice or objection given to Mule-Hide. (T. 177)." The Trial Court
never said anything about "without notice or objection," regarding the use of the product,
Mule-Hide seems to be arguing that the Trial Court found that the purchase order
actually came from ABC Supply. To the contrary, the Trial Court found that Ron Case
Roofing Supply faxed the purchase order and that Ron Case Roofing Supply received
and used the materials. (Trial Tr. 693 at 176-77.) Thus, there would be no need for Ron
Case Supply to "object" to the purchase order (as it made the purchase) nor is there any
such finding by the Trial Court.
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Mule-Hide then asserts that the Trial Court discounted the testimony of Ms. White
and her witnesses. While some discounting of the testimony is obvious in the Court's
decision, the Trial Court made no specific finding of truthfulness or untruthfulness on the
part of any witness. Directly contrary to Mule-Hide's assertion, the Trial Court
specifically avoided making a finding on the disputed testimony of Ms. White and MuleHide's representative regarding alleged phone calls to Ms. White. Certainly if the Trial
Court disbelieved Ms. White as vehemently as argued by Mule-Hide, it would have
resolved this factual dispute. However, it did not.
In sum, Point Two of Mule-Hide's brief lacks any citation to evidence in support
of the Trial Court's finding and further lacks any application of any particular evidence
or finding to any theory of law. Thus, the Court should disregard this point.

III.

POINT THREE OF APPELLEE'S BRIEF CONFLICTS WITH UTAH LAW
AND FAILS TO SUPPORT THE TRIAL COURT'S HOLDING.
In Point Three of its brief, Mule-Hide attempts, essentially, to argue that a person

personally guaranteeing the debts of one company can generally be held liable under that
guarantee for the debts of another company. As this principal is diametrically opposed to
many legal principles established by this Court and the Utah Supreme Court, Mule-Hide
ignores Utah law and instead relies on four cases from Wisconsin (1963), Idaho (1974)
Kansas (1988), and Louisiana (1990).
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The cases cited by Mule-Hide do not support its position. To the contrary, the
cases are either inapplicable to the legal issues at hand or support Ms. White's position.
In Mann v. Erie Mfg. Co., 120 N.W.2d 711 (Wis. 1963), the Wisconsin Supreme Court
addressed only the issue of whether or not an oral guarantee fell within the statute of
frauds. The Court was not presented with any issue related to whether a contractual
guarantee can apply to an entity not named in the guarantee.
In Commercial Credit Corp. v. Chisholm Bros. Farm Equip. Co., 525 P.2d 976
(Idaho 1974), the Idaho Supreme Court also did not address the issue of whether a
contractual guarantee can extend to an entity not named in the guarantee. To the
contrary, the court conducted a detailed analysis of the contractual language in holding
that a guarantee was enforceable only because it was specifically provided for in the
contract between the parties that had not been modified by a subsequent agreement
between the parties. Thus, in focusing on the language of the guarantee, this case
supports Ms. White's position in this case.
In Overland Park Sav. & Loan Assoc, v. Miller, 763 P.2d 1092 (Kan. 1988), the
Kansas Supreme Court held that a guarantor of a non-recourse debt (as related to the
principal debtor) was still liable under the guarantee. Miller, once again, had nothing to
do with extending liability under a guarantee to an entity not named in the guarantee.
Mule-Hide cited language in this case out of context. The language cited by Mule-Hide
is actually a quote from another case cited in Miller - FDIC v. University Anclote, 764
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F.2d 804 (11th Cir. 1985). The Miller Court adopted the rationale of Anclote. Miller at
1099. Contrary to Mule-Hide's citation taken out of context, in Anclote, the Eleventh
Circuit stated:
We have no trouble with Petersen's recitation of the general rules
governing contracts of guaranty. If a guaranty is free from ambiguity, it is
strictly construed in favor of the guarantor. If ambiguous, it is construed
against the drafter ~ here, the Bank and its assignee, the FDIC. A guaranty
is a collateral promise to answer for the debt or obligation of another. The
extent of the guarantor's liability depends upon the language of the
guaranty itself and is usually equal to that of the principal debtor. A
guarantor is liable only in the event and to the extent that his principal is
liable. Finally, if the principal's obligation has been paid or satisfied, the
guarantor's obligation is terminated.
Miller, 763 P.2d at 1100 (citations and quotations omitted). These are the same
principles cited by Ms. White in her initial brief as stated by the Utah Supreme Court.
Thus, this case also supports Ms. White's legal analysis in which she asserts that the
guarantee must be interpreted as it is written which provides only for the guarantee of
debts incurred by her company, not those of Ron Case Roofing Supply.
The final case cited by Mule-Hide is Commercial Nat. Bank In Shreveport v.
Keene, 561 So. 2d 813 (La. App. 1990). In Keene, the Louisiana Court of Appeals
affirmed the Trial Court's holding that a partner who guaranteed the debts of the
partnership and then later sold his interest, was liable on a debt incurred by the
partnership after he sold his interest because he had not revoked his guarantee. Id. at
815-16. Ms. White agrees entirely with the holding and rationale of Keene. The key
distinction between the facts in Keene and those in the instant case is that the company
5

Ms. White guaranteed did not incur the debt. Ms. White's guarantee was for ABC
Supply—her d.b.a. Ron Case Roofing Supply purchased the materials for which MuleHide is attempting to collect payment. Ms. White never guaranteed the debts of Ron
Case Roofing Supply. In sum, Keene provides no support for Mule-Hide's argument.
In conclusion, the cases cited by Mule-Hide do not support its argument that Ms.
White is liable for the debts of a company that she did not guarantee. Moreover, Utah
law, as cited in Ms. White's initial brief, is very clear in holding that a guarantee is to be
strictly construed and extends only to its contractual limits.

IV.

THE DOCTRINE OF EQUITABLE ESTOPPEL WAS NOT RAISED
BEFORE THE TRIAL COURT AND IS NOT APPLICABLE IN THIS
CASE.
A.

Mule-Hide did not Raise the Doctrine of Equitable Estoppel Before the
Trial Court and Therefore this Doctrine Cannot be Raised on Appeal.

Mule-Hide, for the first time in its brief on appeal, claims that Ms. White is liable
to Mule-Hide based on the doctrine of equitable estoppel. Mule-Hide never raised this
cause of action in its Complaint, in any other pleadings, before trial, or at trial.
Moreover, Judge Wilkinson was never presented with the opportunity to evaluate the
evidence in light of this legal theory.
"An appellate court generally will not review any issue that was not raised in the
court below." Ellis v. Swensen, 16 P.3d 1233,1240 (Utah 2000); See Conner v. Union
Pac. R.R., 972 P.2d 414, 418 (Utah 1998) (stating "That issue was not raised below, and
6

we will not address issues raised for the first time on appeal."). "This rule is based, in
part, on the principle that it is unfair to fault the Trial Court for failing to rule correctly
on an issue it was never given the opportunity to consider." Swensen, 16 P.3d at 1240.
It is also important to note that the claim of "equitable estoppel" is a new and
unique claim for relief, not some alternative "ground" for affirming the lower court. The
Utah Supreme Court, in Richardson v. Matador Steak House, Inc., 948 P.2d 347 (Utah
1997), clearly distinguished between an appellate court's authority to affirm a lower
court's decision on other "grounds," from the improper attempt to interpose an
alternative cause of action or claim in support of the Trial Court's ruling. Id. at 350.
In Richardson, the Trial Court ruled that the plaintiffs had a claim under the
Dramshop Act, but that the Act preempted their common law negligence claims. Id. at
350. The defendants obtained permission for an interlocutory appeal of the Trial Court's
ruling that the plaintiffs had a claim under the Dramshop Act. On appeal, the Court ruled
that the Dramshop Act did not provide a claim. Both parties also attempted to have the
Court also consider the preemption issue to avoid subsequent appeals. Id. The Utah
Supreme Court held that the plaintiffs' failure to cross-appeal prevented them from
addressing the issue of preemption. The Court further held that the preemption issue
could not be raised as an "alternative ground" to justify the Trial Court's decision as it
has not been raised in a cross-appeal. Id. The Court stated: "Plaintiffs' common law
claim is an entirely different claim for relief, and we cannot address the validity of that
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claim on the pretext that it might be a valid alternative ground for sustaining the result in
this case." Id.
In sum, Mule-Hide never raised the issue of equitable estoppel below and is
barred from raising it on appeal. The Trial Court never had an opportunity to consider
that legal theory nor did Ms. White have any opportunity to present a focused defense to
the theory. In addition, it is also improper for Mule-Hide to assert the new claim of
Equitable Estoppel as an alternative basis for the Trial Court's decision. In sum, this
Court should disregard Mule-Hide's equitable estoppel argument as it has been raised
improperly.
B.

The Doctrine of Equitable Estoppel Does not Compel the Result that
Ms. White is Liable for the Debts of Ron Case Roofing Supply.

The facts in this case, as presented at trial, do not support Mule-Hide's claim that
Ms. White is liable based on the doctrine of equitable estoppel.
"Equitable estoppel requires proof of three elements:
(I) a statement, admission, act, or failure to act by one party
inconsistent with a claim later asserted;
(ii) reasonable action or inaction by the other party taken or not
taken on the basis of the first party's statement, admission, act, or failure to
act; and
(iii) injury to the second party that would result from allowing the
first party to contradict or repudiate such statement, admission, act, or
failure to act.
Nunley v. Westates Casing Services, Inc., 989 P.2d 1077, 1088 (Utah 1999). Assuming
this claim may be appropriately considered on appeal, Mule-Hide has failed in its burden
to prove any of these three elements.
8

Mule-Hide asserts that Ms. White's failure to revoke the guarantee constitutes the
"failure to act" in the first element of the claim. Mule-Hide ignores the requirement that
the "failure to act" be "inconsistent with a claim later asserted." First, Ms. White has
asserted only that she never signed a personal guarantee for Ron Case Roofing Supply
and that she is not personally liable for its debts. She further asserts that she and her
company did not purchase the materials bought by Ron Case Roofing Supply. None of
these "claims" are inconsistent with her failure to revoke the guarantee. Ms. White
obviously had no need to revoke her guarantee because her business had ceased all
operations and sold or gave its assets to Ron Case Roofing Supply.
Second, Mule-Hide has failed to establish that it acted reasonably. A primary
issue of importance in evaluating Mule-Hide's reasonable reliance, would be the
information that Mule-Hide had regarding Allied and Ron Case Roofing Supply. MuleHide objected to evidence of its knowledge at trial. In contrast to its claim in this appeal,
Mule-Hide's trial counsel argued that Mule-Hide's knowledge was "irrelevant" at trial.
(Trial Tr. 693 at 66.) Notwithstanding Mule-Hide's change of opinion from the trial to
this appeal, the Trial Court specifically found as follows:
Mule-Hide gets a purchase order of which, apparently, from the
evidence, it was faxed from Ron Case Supply, but Allied Building
Components, post office box so and so, Salt Lake City, Shipped to so and
so, and sent to Mule-Hide at their office in (inaudible), Wisconsin, or Ivins.
This was dated on March 19, 1998, after that so-called notice went out, that
even if the notice had received them, and then they received this order, it
would certainly cause a business to wonder what's going on back in Salt
Lake as to what's happening. But that was the company or the-- Allied had
9

not revoked anything, as far as the guarantee is concerned, by certified
mail. The Court finds that they had the right to rely on that. They did, of
course, then prepare their purchase- or their invoice and sent the materials
out. And, of course, it was used by, I guess, Ron Case Supply Company.
While these findings are unclear, it does appear that the Trial Court made specific
findings that when Mule-Hide received the order, which indicates on its face that it is
faxed from Ron Case Roofing Supply, they should have wondered "what's going on
back in Salt Lake." In addition, Mule-Hide shipped the materials to Ron Case Roofing
Supply's address, not that of Allied.
Moreover, the Trial Court fails to mention the evidence introduced through Dave
Homerding, Mule-Hide's representative in Utah. Mr. Homerding was the regional sales
manager in Utah for Mule-Hide during 1997 and through the fall of 1998 (during the
time the purchase was made). He was Mule-Hide's company representative in this area.
(Trial Tr. 693 at 28:1-11, 107:10-19.) Mr. Homerding sold products to ABC Supply and
to Ron Case Roofing Supply. Mr. Homerding was aware that ABC Supply had closed
and that Ron Case Roofing Supply had been formed in a new location. He dealt with
Ron Case Roofing Supply on a regular basis. (Trial Tr. 693 at 108:12-25.) Mr.
Homerding stated that he believed that ABC Supply had "moved and, I guess, changed
ownership or changed names, or both, to Ron Case Supply." (Trial Tr. 693 at 108:1523.) Mr. Homerding noticed that the address changed, the employees changed, and the
name changed. He believed it was more than just a name change, "more of a

10

reorganization and move." (Trial Tr. 693 at 120:12-25.) This evidence was
uncontroverted at trial.
In sum, Mule-Hide failed to prove that it acted reasonably under the
circumstances. To the contrary, Mule-Hide argued at trial that its knowledge (which is
the central issue in reasonable reliance) was "irrelevant." Additionally, the evidence
indicated that Mule-Hide, through its representative, was fully aware of facts that would
create doubt in its reliance on the guarantee for purchases and shipments to a new
company.
Finally, Mule-Hide presented no evidence that it was injured from Ms. White's
failure to revoke the guarantee. Mule-Hide failed to show that Ron Case Roofing Supply
could not have paid the invoice in question. In fact, Mule-Hide never brought this action
against Ron Case Roofing Supply. When Ms. White attempted to introduce evidence of
Ron Case Roofing Supply's ability to pay the invoices in question, Mule-Hide objected
to the answer claiming it was irrelevant, and the Trial Court sustained the objection.
(Trial Tr. 693 at 75.) Mule-Hide failed to introduce any evidence indicating that Ron
Case Roofing Supply, the admitted purchaser of the materials, could not or would not
pay.
In conclusion, Mule-Hide failed to prove the elements necessary to prevail on the
claim of equitable estoppel against Ms. White. Moreover, that claim was never properly
raised before the Trial Court.
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V.

MULE-HIDE HAS FAILED TO RAISE ANY COHESIVE ARGUMENT IN
POINT FOUR (THE SECOND POINT FOUR) OF ITS BRIEF RELATED
TO AGENCY AND ESTOPPEL
After citing general principles of agency, Mule-Hide makes no argument or

attempt to apply these principles to the facts in this case. Moreover, these claims were
never raised before the Trial Court. As such, the Appeals Court should disregard these
claims.

VI.

MULE-HIDE'S ARGUMENT IN POINT FIVE OF ITS BRIEF LACKS ANY
SPECIFICITY OR AUTHORITY.
In Point Five of its brief, Mule-Hide attempts to counter Ms. White's argument

that the Trial Court improperly excluded evidence. Mule-Hide's argument in Point Five
of its brief is one paragraph of conclusory statements without any argument of the law or
facts. Mule-Hide has not attempted to counter Ms. White's factual and legal citations on
this issue. As Mule-Hide has presented no counter-argument to Ms. White's assertion,
Ms. White cites the Court to pages 40-45 of its brief in which she addresses this issue.

CONCLUSION
Based on the evidence presented at the trial, the Trial Court erred as a matter of
law in holding that Ms. White was liable for the purchase made by Ron Case Roofing
Supply. The evidence was clear and the court found that Ron Case Roofing Supply
purchased the materials at issue. The purchase order was sent from Ron Case Roofing
12

Supply and the materials were delivered to Ron Case Roofing Supply. Ms. White's
contractual guarantee guaranteed only the debts of her business, ABC Supply.
Notwithstanding these findings, the Trial Court incorrectly held Ms. White liable for the
purchase based on the "most innocent party doctrine" and because Ms. White knew
"what was taking place." The Trial Court further erred in failing to make sufficient
findings to provide any meaningful review of its ruling. Not only did it fail to make
findings on several material issues, the findings it did make were so ambiguous as to
render any review of its ruling pure guesswork. The Trial Court erred and abused its
discretion in restricting Ms. White's cross-examination of Mule-Hide's sole witness as
necessary to impeach her testimony regarding purported conversations with Ms. White.
Finally, the Trial Court erred and abused its discretion in not permitting Ms. White to
introduce relevant evidence to establish that Mule-Hide knew it was dealing with Ron
Case Roofing regarding the purchase. Mule-Hide has failed to counter the arguments
raised by Ms. White.
WHEREFORE, Ms. White asks the Court, based on the evidence presented at
trial, to reverse the Trial Court and hold that she is not liable for the purchases of an
entity for which she provided no guarantee. In the alternative, Ms. White asks the court
to remand this case for a new trial due to the Court's failure to make sufficient findings
(a remand for additional findings is impossible due to the retirement of the judge
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conducting the trial) and because the Trial Court refused to permit necessary crossexamination to impeach Mule-Hide's witness and the presentation of relevant evidence.
DATED this 25th day of July, 2001.
McKay, Burton & Thurman

AUjA^I
John Dustin Morris
ley for the Defendant and Appellant

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on zufo day of July, 2001,1 mailed by first class mail, postage
prepaid, a true and correct copy of the foregoing to the following:
Tim Dalton Dunn
Clifford Ross
DUNN & DUNN, P.C.
460 Midtown Plaza
230 South 500 East
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102

uQ£fatobs

14

